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torts, when there is no proof of carelessness or wrong intent.
And even within these narrow limits, the conflict of authority as
to the extent of the application of the maxim would suggest
extreme caution in regard to placing much reliance' upon it. So
that upon the whole, we may safely conclude that those consequences which the law treats as too remote for consideration in
estimating damages, must be such as the defendant had no just
ground to expect would flow from his act-in other words-such
as were, upon the basis of his knowledge, rather accidental than
natural, or ordinary. We shall not be expected to discuss the much
vexed question, what amounts to an accident, or what damages are
natural and what accidental. The term, with reference to accident
policies, has been defined as "any event which takes place without
the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon, or affected
by the event :" WITHEY, J., in Ripley v. By. PassengerAssurance
Co., 2 Bigelow Ins. Cas. 738 ; ProvidenceLife is. Co. v. Martin,
32 Md. 310. The cases are considerably numerous where this definition is substantially confirmed. And as it so nearly coincides
with the rule before stated, we shall not say more, trusting that
we have sufficiently removed any ground of misapprehending what
we before said upon the force and application of the maxim.
I. F. R.
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CLARK AND WIFE v. GILBERT.
A married woman to whom possession of land is delivered under a parol gift, and
who occupies the land uninterruptedly, adversely and exclusively as her own for
fifteen years, thereby acquires a complete title in herself, subject to an estate by
eurtesy in her husband, where the husband, although living with her, claims no
independent, exclusive occupation in himself.
Possession taken under a parol gift is adverse in the donee against the donor,
andif continued for fifteen years perfects the title of the donee as against the donor.
The donor in such case not only knows that the possession is adverse, but intends
it to be so, and there is no occasion for any notoriety. Notoriety is only important where the adverse character of the possession is to be brought home to the
owner by presumption.

BILL in equity, praying for a decree vesting the title to certain
land in Jane E. Clark, one of the petitioners; brought to the SuI Mr. Hooyh, the reporter, will accept our thanks for this case, and some others.
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perior Court in Middlesex county, and reserved for advice on facts
found by the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Tyler and Culver, for the petitioners.
Chadwick and i.

. Robinson, for the respondent.

BUTLER, 0. J.-The mitterial facts on which this case rests, extracted from the findings, are as follows:Henry W. Gilbert, the uncle of the petitioner, Jane E. Clark,
desired that Mrs. Clark and her husband, who then resided in
Meriden, should remove to Chester, that he might enjoy her society.
In the year 1850, to induce them to leave Meriden and remove to
Chester, the said Gilbert promised that, if they would abandon
business in Meriden and so remove, lie would set the husband,
Linus Clark, up in business, and build a house for his wife. They
(lid so remove, and pursuant to his promises said Gilbert put said
Linus in possession of a factory and business, and commenced
making arrangements to build a house for his wife. At that time
iewas the owner of the house in question, but it was then occupied by one Hlenshaw. Ithnshaw soon left and removed from the
state, and the said Gilbert then abandoned the idea of building,
and gave the key of the dwelling-house in question to his said
niece, Mrs. Clark, saying to her, "There is a house foi -you; 'it is
a comfortable place, and I think you will be pleased with it. It is
convenient for keeping a cow, and boarding your husband's workmen. The place is yours. You can make such improvements and
alterations in it as you please." The said Jane with her husband
thereupon took possession of the premises, and continued in possession for about twenty years. Said Gilbert left the country in
1852, giving said Jane to understand, when the place was alluded
to between the time when she took possession and the time of his
leaving, that the place was hers, and he did not thereafter, at any
time before the bringing of this bill, say or do, or authorize to be
said or done, anything inconsistent with that idea. The petitioner,
Jane E. Clark, from the time that she and her husband went into
possession of the place in 1850, occupied the premises as her own
until 1870, paid a mechanic's lien which existed thereon, and paid
for changes in and improvements thereon, and, so far as a feme

covert living on premises with her husband can occupy, did so exclusively and uninterruptedly, except as follows. The said Ilenry
W. Gilbert had other property in the state, and when he left in
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1852, gave the respondent a general power of attorney, and the
respondent in 1855 gave by lease to Henshaw the privilege of digging a well, and laying a pipe on said demanded premises, of which
said Linus had knowledge, but said Jane had not. The respondent
also, as agent of Henry W. Gilbert, paid the taxes on the demanded premises front 1851 to 1857, but not thereafter until he
levied an execution thereon. No other acts inconsistent with the
title or possession of the petitioners during fifteen years next following the commencement of their occupation appear in the findings. The respondent in 1868 brought a suit in the Superior
Court against Henry W. Gilbert, obtained judgment by default,
took out execution and levied it on the demanded premises as the
property of H. W. Gilbert, and thereupon brought his action of
ejectment against the petitioner, Linus Clark. On the trial of
that case said Linus set up in defence the title in his wife by gift
as aforesaid, and also a legal title in himself by adverse possession.
The respondent thereupon offered evidence of admissions of said
Linus inconsistent with an adverse possession in himself, but the
petitioner, Jane E. Clark, had no knowledge of any acts or admissions of said Linus inconsistent with her title and possession,
and it did not appear that said Linus did any act, or made any
admission, inconsistent with her title and possession, or his own,
within fifteen years next following the commencement of her occupation, or did any act, or made any declaration, indicative of a
claim of exclusive title or possession in himself, at any time before
the attachment and levy. The respondent obtained judgment in
his action of ejectment, and removed the petitioners from the
premises, and they thereupon brought this petition. On these
facts are the petitioners, or either of them, entitled to relief? I
think Jane E. Clark is.
In the first place, I think on principle that a married woman
can under circumstances like these, perfect a parol gift of real
estate by an uninterrupted possession of fifteen years, where the
husband, although living with her, claims no independent, exclusive occupation in himself. Why should it not be so ? The law
does not vest him with any title or possession until the wife has
acquired a title, and he had no legal right of possession therefore
in this case during the fifteen years. It does not appear that he
claimed during that period, or individually exercised, any right or
possession in himself, and the court find that the possession was
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hers, if, as a married woman, she could legally possess. I see no
reason why she cannot possess under such circumstances, nor why,
having been put in possession individually by a gift, the possession
may not properly be considered as continuedly hers, the husband
making no claim to it. She certainly can have possession, and
-maintain it, where property is given to her for her sole and separate use, even as against h(r husband. And so she may, as against
donor or husband, of person-l property given for her separate use.
I shall inquire hereafter whether this was so given, but on this
point it is immaterial. If she can hold a possession when put in,
and where the husband does not claim adversely to her, or interfere with it, the finding of the court establishes her possession in
this case. As a legal proposition I think it clear .that she may
possess under such circumstances as are found here.
Much has been said about an open, notorious possession, but
such expressions are not applicable to a case like this. Possession
taken under a parol gift is adverse in the donee against the donor,
and if continued for fifteen years perfects the title of the donee as
against the donor. The donor in such cases not only knows that
the possession is adverse, but intends it to be, and there is no occasion for any notoriety. Notoriety is only important where the
adverse character of the possession is t o be brought home to the
owner by presumption. Of course where it is shown that lie had
actual knowledge that the possession was under claim of a title,
and therefore adverse, openness and notoriety are unimportant,
for no other person has any legal interest in the question, or right
to be informed by notoriety or otherwise. So long as Henry W.
Gilbert knew that his niece was holding the premises as her own,
under a gift from him, and would acquire a complete title at the
end of fifteen years, she was not bound to make claim of right, or
proclaim the character of her possession, until it was denied by
him, or some agent of his authorized to make the denial. No act
or declaration of his or of his agent came to her knowledge which
required her to speak. I think there can be no doubt therefore
that there was a gift to her, and possession delivered her pursuant
to the gift ; that possession was continued adversely for more than
fifteen years, and that neither the husband nor the donor, nor any
authorized agent of his, so interrupted or disturbed that possession
as to prevent the acquisition by her of a complete title. The act
of authorizing a well to be dug and pipes to be laid in the land is
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of little importance. It was the act of an agent who had no special authority to interfere with the possession of this property,
and certainly a general authority, upon the facts found, would not
authorize it. The same may be said in respect to -the taxes. As
there was no conveyance of the property on record the assessors
naturally continued to put it into the list of H. W. Gilbert, and
the taxes were paid by his agent. The fact that he soon discontinued paying the taxes is a much more significant fact for the
petitioner.
This view of the principles involved is sustained by all the decisions involving the questions which have been found. The gei:cr'
principle that a husband, occupying the property of the wife with
her or solely, is presumed to be occupying in subordination to her
title, is generally recognised. See 2 Selden 342, and cases there
cited.
There have been two cases analogous to this decided in our sister
states during the last ten years. The first was the case of Steel
v. Johason, 4 Allen 425, decided in 1862. In that case, the father
gave to his daughter, who was a married woman, some real estate,
and put her in possession of it, and she continued to hold possession for more than twenty years, and it was holden that by operation of law she thereby became vested with a complete title to the
estate, which neither the father nor his grantees during his life,
nor his heirs at law after his death, could successfully contest.
Another analogous case which arose in New Jersey and was
decided in 1867, was that of Outealt v. Ludlow, 32 N. J. 239.
In that case a father gave a house and lot to a married daughter,
and -put her and her husband in possession, and they occupied
until the Statute of Limitation had run against the father. Upon
the question, whether she or her husband was entitled to claim
title acquired by. such possession, it was holden, first, that a possession so entered into in right of the wife could nat be taken advantage of by the husband to the prejudice of his wife, for his possession was only through her, and he could not by any act of his own
against hig wife, change it into a possession adverse to her. Second,
that if she was.permitted by the father to hold possession of the
property as hers, and by lapse of time such adverse possession ripened into a title, that title was hers. In that case possession was
delivered to the husband as well as the wife, but in this case possession was delivered to the wife alone, and it does not appear
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that during the fifteen years next thereafter Mr. Clark claimed
any legal possession, nor indeed does it appear that he claimed
any distinct possession at all, until be set it up as a contingent
alternative in the ejectment suit.
These two decisions are recent, are in harmony with the prdgressive thought and legislation of the day, and cover the whole
ground. For whether the wife alone in this case is deemed to
have been in possession, as in the case in Allen, or whether they
are both to be deemed to have been in possession, or the husband
to have held the possession in her right, as in the case in New
Jersey, her parol gift must be considered as having ripened into a
perfect title by lapse of time, if these decisions are correct expositions of the law. We think they are entitled to great respect,
that they are founded upon correct principles, and characterized
by good sense, and that in this case a perfect title was acquired
by Mrs. Clark against Henry W. Gilbert, the donor, after a lapse
of fifteen years from the time of the gift and the taking of possession under it, and before the attachment and levy of the respondent.
But several other questions arise in the case. First, did the
husband become tenant by the curtesy when the title became perfect in her? Second, if so, what effect is the judgment of Alexander Gilbert against Linus Clark in ejectment to have in relation
to the decree ?
It is undoubtedly a general rule that the husband becomes tenant
by the curtesy in any estate which accrues to the wife during
coverture, unless given in trust, or given to her for her sole and
separate use. There is no trust here, nor is it clear that the donor
intended it for her sole and separate use. Assuming then that
Linus Clark took a life-estate by the curtesy, what bearing has that
judgment upon the case? Alexander Gilbert obtained no.title by his
attachment and levy, for a complete title had then vested in Jane
E. Clark, and as incident thereto an estate by curtesy in her
husband. The judgment therefore is without foundation and erroneous, but it stands unreversed against Linus Clark, and as to him
determines all right of possession in this property, and has been
consummated by the dispossession of both the petitioners. It is
inoperative against Jane E. Clark, for she was not a party to it,
and she is entitled to a decree to establish her title, subject to the
tenancy of her husband. But Linus Clark cannot impeach that
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j-,dgment in this proceeding except upon the ground of fraud,
and that is not found. We can advise no decree therefore which
will restore him to his title or possession, for- that and another
reason. It appears by the finding that he distinctly claimed a
righlt to the possession on the facts in the case by virtue of a title
in his wife, and that the claim was overruled. That ruling was
erroneous on the facts as they appear of record in that case, and
furnishes a sufficient ground for reversing the judgment. And as
his right to a writ of error is not barred, he has adequate remedy
at law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The foregoing case presents two practical questions in regard to the effect of
adverse possession upon the title to land,
which it is of the utmost importance to
American lawyers clearly to understand.
1. The precise point of time, When a
possession of land, taken by consent of
the owner, may become adverse to such
owner, and the effect of the continuance
of such possession, in transferring the
title to the party in possession. Certain
general principles, incidentally affecting
these questions, are well understood and
conceded by all; as that one in possession of land acknowledging the title of
another to such land cannot resist the
title of such other or acquire his title,
without his knowledge and consent,
however long the possession may continue. From these axiomatic propositions some have assumed, that no title
could be acquired by a possession,
whose inception proceeded from anytrust
between the parties, whether express or
implied. But there is no foundation for
the assumption to that extent. The only
proposition maintainable upon this point
is, that a possession beginning in trust or
by the consent of the owner of the land,
will never transfer the title to the land
to ihe party in possession, except in conformity to the trust or contract, so long
as the possessor continues to recognise
the trust and to hold under it. Ile may
renounce the contract and claim to hold

the land in his own right against all the
world and if, after this becomes known
to the owner of the land, such possession
continues long enough to bar the right
of entry, the title will be vested in the
possessor : 1Jillison v. Watkins, 3 Pet.
U. S. 43 : Greene v. fnson, 9 Vt. 37;
Hall v. Davis, 10 Vt. 593.
But upon the assumption that the
possession continues as it began, under
contract between the owner of the land
and the party in possession, its effect
will be to confirm the contract under
which the entry was made and continued. If the possessor enters under a
parol gift his continued possession is hut
confirming such gift, until the period of
the Statute of Limitations has expired,
when the title will become perfected in
the donee, notwithstanding at the time
of his entry and during the whole period
of his occupancy he may have recognised
the title of the donor. In such a case
all the elements of adverse possession
concur ; the donee claims to hold the
land in his own right, and the dIonor
acquiesces in the justice of such claim.
The case is stronger than where the
party enters by strict and forcible disseisin, for there the owner of the land
does not acquiesce in the claim of title
by the possessor: Sumner v. Stephens, 6
Met. (Mass.) 337, opinion of SHAw,
Ch. J., commented upon ante, 12 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 276. So also where
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land is bonght and the price paid, but
no deed executed ; if tile purchaser enter
and continue to hold the land it will
enure to his benefit as an adverse holding, and the title be perfected after the
lapse of the period of the statute: Brown
v. Kinq, 5 Met. (Mass.) 173; Ellison
v. Cathcarl, I Me'Mullan (S. C.) 5. So
tco if the land is contracted to le sold
and the terms of payment fixed, although
the price is not fully paid ; if possession
is given under tie contract, the purchaser, although holding under the contract
and to that extent by the permission of
the seller and acknowledging, to the
fullest extent, the title as being in
the seller, must nevertheless Ie considered as holding in his own right and
under a claim of title, so long as lie
performs the contract of putchase on his
part. lie is not, in any proper sense,
tenant of the land to any one, or in any
form, and if the contract is in writing,
as, under the Statute of Frauds it must
be. to be of any force, the purchaser, so
long as he performs the contract on his
part, cannot be evicted from the possession by the seller. A court of equity
will enjoin such a suit. It is only when
the purchaser fuils to perform the contract on his part, that he becomes a
tenant at sufferance, and liable to eviction. The possession of the purchaser
may not Ile adverse to the seller, in the
sense of depriving him of his remedy
under the contract, so long as the purchaser claims undler the contract (and of
course claims nothing beyond it), and the
acquiescence of tile seller is only to the
extent of the contract, as held in Woods
v. Dille, It Ohio 455. But where the
purchaser fully performs the contract on
his part, we cannot comprehend why his
possession unuder claim of title in himself against all the world, must not date
from tile time of entering upon the land
under the contract, and thus, after the
lapse of the full term of tile Statute of
Limitations and the performance of the

contract, vest the title in him. That
has been his claim and the concession
of the former owner, during the entire
period of the Statute of Limitations, and
that is all there is in any case of title
acquired under the statute. There is,
no doubt, under this view of the question, the possibility that some anomalies
may occur, not contemplated in other
cases, under this branch of the law.
The period for payments under the contract may extend beyond the term of the
Statute of Limitations, and in such cases
no title could become perfected in the
purchaser until his contract was performed. This is his claim, and this the
ground of acquiescence on the other
part. But in this there is nothing which
need deter us from adopting the rule.
This is but the ordinary condition of all
possessory titles and of perfected titles
acquired by possession.
The title acquired is according to the claim of the
possessor and the acquiescence of the
holder of the title. One may lie in possession of land, for the term of the statute,
claiming the right to hold the land
against all the world, and still not acquire title in fee. His title will be according to the nature of hiis claim,
whether as tenant in fee or for life or
years or only at will, or by sufferance.
2. This proposition, is well illustrated
by the next point in the case. Where
husband and wife live upon land in the
ordinary mode, the law interprets the
possession as that of the husband, as
indeed it must, so long as lie is regarded
as the head and director of the affair
of the family. But the title acquired by
such holding of the husband may entire
for the benefit of the wife and will do so,
if the husband's claim of title was it the
right of the wife. There is no more inconsistency in allowing the contract or
claim to define the character of the possession in one particular than in another.
The extent of possession is always defined
by the contract under which possession
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is held. Without reference to any deed
or contract affecting the land, the possession will be limited to the actual occuSo too the
pancy, possessio pedis.
possession of land, in general, indicates
claim of ownership in fee, since that
Nsthe more common way in which ocenjants of land in this country hold it.
lut the deed, or contract, or claim, of
.he occupant must be referred to, not
only to determine the extent of the possession, whether it be only of the piece

enclosed, or of the whole tract ; but also
the character of the possession, whether
in right of the occupant or of another,
and equally of what particular title,
more or less, the possession is to be
trelted as the exponent. The decision
seems unquestionable upon both points,
and we hope we have been able to show
their importance in the different applications which may be made of the principles involved.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of .Errors of Connecticut.
FITCH v. GATES.
A non-negotiable note payable on demand was executed to F. by the defendant.
Fourteen years later the note was transferred and delivered by F. to the plaintiff
tn part payment of a debt, and the plaintiff brought suit in his own name thereon
under the statute authorizing a suit so to be brought. At the time the plaintiff
took the note of F. the defendant had for several years had a claim on book against
F. greater than the note. The plaintiff knew this and had shortly before been
present at a meeting of F. and the defendant at which they had attempted to adjust
their mutual claims, and at which F. had told him that lie intended to apply the
note in part payment of his indebtedness to the defendant. HIe also knew that
the defendant expected such application to be made. The application however
was not actually made at the time, the parties separating without having agreed as
to the exact balance due. Whether the defendant could set off his claim against
the note in-the suit: Qucere. The authorities both English and American are in
conflict and confusion upon the point.
Whether or not such set-off could be made in an ordinary case, yet here the
plaintiff must be regarded as having taken the note with full knowledge of an understanding of the parties that it should be applied upon the book account of the
plaintiff, and therefore as having taken it subject to the right of the defendant to
make the set-off.
It was not found in terms that F. was insolvent at the time the set-off was sought
to be made, but it appeared that the defendant had obtained judgment against F.
more than a year before for the amount, that the debt had then been of several
years' standing, and that the execution obtained upon the judgment had never been
collected. Held, that it might reasonably be inferred that F. had not the means
of payment or that they were beyond the reach of legal process.
ASSUMPSIT by the plaintiff as
against the maker; brought to
New London county, and tried
of a set-off, closed to the court.

assignee of a non-negotiable note,
the Court of Common Pleas of
on the general issue, with notice
The court found the facts and
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reserved the case for the advice of this court.
stated in the opinion.

The facts are fully

-Prattand Thresher, for the plaintiff, cited TFleeler v. Raymond,
5 Cowen 231 ; Raymond v. Wheeler, 9 Id. 295, 800; Johnson v..
Drihtqe, 6 Id. 693; Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wend. 842; Gunn v.,
Seovil, 5 Day 113; ic.Lean v. SicLean, 1 Conn. 397 ; Palmerv.
Green, 6 Id. 24; Francisv. Rand, 7 Id. 221 ; Pitkin v. Pitkin,
8 1I. 325; Savings Bank v. Bates, Id. 505; Robinson v. Lyman,
10 Id. 30; Starkey v. Peters, 18 Id. 181; Eastern Bank v.
Capron, 22 Id. 639; Nichols v. Dayton, 34 Id. 65; Bishop v.
.Fowler,35 Id. 5; 1 Swift Dig. 434, 713 ; Holland v. lMakepeace,
8 Mass. 418 ; Grew v. Burditt, 9 Pick. 265; Chandler v. Drew,
6 N. lainp. 469; MeDuffie v. Dame, 11 Id. 244; Adams v.
Bliss, 16 Verm. 39; Robinson v. Breedlove, 7 Port. 541; Cumberland Bank v. Rand, 3 Harr. 222; Giregg v. James, Breese
107; Beals v. Cuernsey, 8 Johns. 446, 452; Jfrickhamr v. Hiller,
12 Id. 320, 823; Burroughsv. Moss, 10 Barn. & Cress. 558.
Lucas, with whom was Park, for the defendant, cited Gen.
Statutes, p. 24, see. 109; 1 Parsons on Cont. (5th ed.) 230;
Robinson v. Lyman, 10 Conn. 30; Babcock v. Callender, 17 Id.
34; Benjamin v. Benjamin, Id. 110; Ripley v. Bull, 19 Id. 53;
Adams v. Leavens, 20 Id. 73; Peaboc7, v. Peters, 5 Pick. 1;
Thomas v. Lewis, 9 Id. 867; Baxter v. Little, 6 Met. 7; Bond
v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Gray 91; Sanborn v. little, 3 N. llamp. 539;
Shapley v. Bellows, 4 Id. 347 ; M42yers v. Davis, 22 N. York 489 ;
Brashear v. TWest, 7 Peters 608; Chitty on Cont. 138, and note
m ; Waterman on Set-off 113, 114, 116, 125, 130, and notes.
FOSTER, J.-A note for $88.74, payable to John Fitch, on demand, with interest, was given him by the defendant on the 21st
of February 1853. On the 26th of August 1867, this note was
transferred and delivered to the plaintiff, by the payee, in part
payment of a debt due from the payee to the plaintiff. This suit
is brought by the plaintiff in his own name, by virtue of the provisions of our statute of 1864, authorizing the assignee and equitable and bond fide owner of any chose in action, not by law
negotiable, this to sue. The facts are found by the Court of
Common Pleas, and the case is reserved for the advice of this
court as to what judgment shall be rendered.
In addition to the fact that the plaintiff took this note when
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more than fourteen years overdue, it appears that he took it with
knowledge that the defendant, the maker of the note, had a claim
on book against John Fitch, the payee, and for several years had
had such claim, greater in amount than the amourit of the note.
The plaintiff had been present on two several occasions when John
Fitch and the lefendant were together for the purpose of settling
up all accounts and demands subsisting between them. The last
of these meetings was at the plaintiff's house, and he was told by
John Fitch that he intended to apply this note, and other noteE
held by him against the defendant, to liquidate or set off his indebtedness on book. The plaintiff also knew that the defendant
understood and expected that the balance due him on book was tc
be applied to pay the note, but the parties separated without agreeing as to the exact balance so due, and without actually applying
it upon the note. Very soon after, this note was assigned to the
plaintiff, and on the defendant's refusal to pay it, which was immediately after payment was demanded, this suit was commenced.
The defendant subsequently prosecuted his claim against John
Fitch to final judgment, and now holds an execution against him
for $250 damages, and $49.08 costs, dated the 22d of June 1871,
which he seeks to set off against this note; denying also that the
plaintiff is the equitable and bondfide holder of the same. The
plaintiff insists that he is the bondfide holder, and that he is not
liable to such set-off.
The question of set-off must be determined by our statute, which
is a transcript of the English statute of 2d George I. Various
points in the law of set-off have frequently been discussed and decided in this court. Most of the cases are collected in a note to
.Ripley v. Bull, 19 Conn. 58, 2d ed.
We have regarded the decision of the English courts as authorities ; our statute upon this subject and theirs being similar, and
in some clauses identical. In the earlier cases the courts in England gave the statute a liberal construction, regarding it as a remedial one, and thus protected almost every description of equitable
interest, even against the claims of assignees, endorsees, &c. 'The
sphere of the influence of this statute seems gradually to have been
contracting, and the later cases certainly tend to restrict its application solely to claims between the parties on the record. The
cases of Bottomley v. Brooke, 1 T. R. 621; Budge v. Birch, 1
T. R. 622; Brown v. .Davis, 8 T. R. 80, with others which might
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be quoted, decided in the latter part of the last century, and in
the beginning of this, are examples of the former class of these
cases : Burrough v. Moss, 10 3. & C. 558 (21 E. C. L. 128);
Isberg v. Bowen, 8 Exch. 52, and Oulds v. Harrison, 10 Exch.
572, are examples of the latter class of cases. Several of the
earlier cases have been distinctly overruled; indeed Baron PARKE
in Isberg v. Bowen, 8 Exch. 52, says "they may be considered
exploded." The case of Burrough v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558,
was quoted by this court with approbation in Bobinson v.
Lyman, 10 Conn. 80, and seems to have had a controlling influence in its decision, for PETERS, J., said he thought the law was
otherwise till he saw that case. The case of Isberg v. Bowen
seems to restrict the application of the statute to mutual, legal
debts between the parties of record. The action was for freight,
due under a charter-party. Plea, that the plaintiff entered into
the charter-party as master of the ship, for and on behalf of
and as agent for the owner, that the plaintiff bad no beneficial
interest in the charter, or any lien on the freight, and. that he
brought the action solely as agent and trustee for the owner, who
was indebted to the defendant in a certain amount, which the defendant offered to set-off. This plea was held insufficient on demurrer ; the Court of Exchequer deciding that "the statute of
set-off did not apply." Baron MARTIN in. giving the opinion of
the court, said, " The statute enacts that ' where there are mutual
debts between the plaintiff and the defendant, one debt may be set
against the other.' This is the whole enactment as applicable to
the present case, and upon its true construction the question depends. If the words of the statute had been, that where there
were mutual debts, the one might be set against the other, the argument for the defendant would have had more weight; but these
are not the only words, for the debts are to be mutual debts between the plaintiff and defendant,- and there is no debt here due
from the plaintiff at all; and except the words, ' between the plaintiff and the defendant,' can be excluded, the plea cannot be maintained. * * * Looking at the plain words of the statute, we best
give effect to the true rule now adopted by all the courts at Westminster for its construction, by holding that inasmuch as ihe debts
are not mutual debts, between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
one cannot be set off against the other." This case was decided
in 1853; that of BorroVq v. 11foss in 1880. A still more recent
case is that of Oidds v. Harrison,which certainly goes a very ex-
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treme length. It was an. action brought by an endorsee of a bill
of exchange, o'erdue, against the acceptor. The defendant pleaded
that after the bill became due, and before endorsement, the drawer
was indebted to the defendant in a sum exceeding' the amount of
the bill; and that the drawer, in order to defraud the defendant,
and in collusion with the plaintiff, endorsed thebill to the plaintiff
after it became due, without consideration, in order to enable him
to sue the defendant on it, and that the plaintiff sued merely as
the agent of the drawer, and in collusion with him, and that the
sum due from the drawer to the defendant had not been paid. On
demurrer to this plea the court held it no answer to the action, and
gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Turning from the English to the American cases, and going no
farther than to the state of New York and to our sister states of
New England, we find a great want of harmony in the decisions
upon this subject. The statutes of some of these states, particularly of Rhode Island and Vermont, contain some provisions of a
peculiar character; hence, decisions in those states will not be of
equal authority, outside their several jurisdictions, as if their statutes were similar to our own. Such is the case of Trafford v.
Hall, 7 R. I. 104, and Adams v. Bliss, 16 Verm. 89, both of which
seem to have been fully examined and carefully considered. The
statutes of New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine,
are substantially like our own; but the decisions of their courts,
upon matters of set-off, differ widely from each other, and there is,
notoinfrequently, a direct conflict between those of the same state.
The early decisions in the state of New York favored very
strongly the claim of set-off: Furman v. Haskins, 2 Caines 368;
O' Callaghan v. Sawyer, 5 Johns. 118; and Ford v. Stewart, 19
Johns. 342, are examples. In O'Callaghanv. Sawyer the action
was brought by the endorsee of an overdue promissory note against
the maker. The defendant claimed to! set off a debt due him from
the payee and endorser. In the Common Pleas the set-off was
denied, but in the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed.
The court say :-" The set-off ought to have been received. The
note had long been due and dishonored when it was endorsed, and
the point has been too long settled and too repeatedly recognised to
require any discussion now, that th~e endorsee takes the note subject
to all the equity and to every defence which existed against it in
the hands of the original payee." This was in 1809, and nearly
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twenty years after the same court, in the case of Jolnson v. Bridge,
6 Cowen 693, overruled this decision, and others of like character,
laying down as law that there could be no set-off except as against
the plaintiff on the record. This case went to the Court of Errors,
and is reported in 5 Wend. 342. On the question, " Shall this
decision be reversed ?" the court stood twelve to twelve; so it was
affirmed. Had the rules of the court permitted the question to
have been put in the opposite form, "Shall this decision be affirmed ?" of course it would have been reversed. In a subsequent
ease, Driggs v. Rockwell, 11 Wend. 504, the Court of Errors reversed the decision of the Supreme Court which had rejected the
set-off, on the ground that it was not admissible except as against
the party to the record. The Chancellor, in giving the opinion of
the court on reversal, says: "In the case of a promissory note transferred after due, and thus dishonored on its face, and where according to well settled and indisputable authorities it is taken wholly
on the credit of the assignor, I would not only allow a set-off
against the party to* the record, and the party in interest, but
against every party throuigh whose hands it has passed." This
was after the revision of the statutes which defined the circumstances under which a set-off might be made in an action on a
promissory note overdue, but the court said that the right existed
before as well as after the revision.
In the case of Farringtonv. The Park Bank, 39 Barb. 645,
though it involved no question of set-off, and though it differs in
essential points from the case at bar, yet the rights of the holder
for value of a promissory note overdue and dishonored, were discussed and considered. The court say, p. 651: "The holder takes
it in the light of an assignee from the person from whom he receives
it, rather than an endorsee according to the usage of trade, and
he therefore takes just such title, and no other, as his a3signor had
to it at the time of the tranrsfer.""
There are numerous cases in Massachusetts. Holland v. Makepeace, 8 Mass. 418, was an action on two cheeks, brought by an
assignee. The defendant claimed to set off a note which he had
purchased against the payee of the checks, and wh'eh he held
when the checks were transferred to the plaintiff. The decision
was that the note could not be 'set off, and the reasoning of the
court supports the doe'trine that set-offs are confined to the parties
in the suit. In a subsequent case, Peabody v. Peters, 5 Pick. 1,,
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the same court seemed to recognise as law, that filing an account.
in set-off is a remedy that exists only interparties to the contract.
In the case of Sargent v. Southgate, 5 Pick. 812, a different conclusion was arrived at by the same court. That was an action
brought by the endorsee of an overdue promissory note, and the
defendant was alldwed to set off a negotiable note made to him by
the payee, and held by the defendant before the transfer of the
note in suit. PARKER, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court
says: "It is. true that the statute of set-off contemplated mutual
demands between the same parties; but the common law or law
merchant treats the -holder of a promissory note, which was dishonored when he took it, as the party to the contract for all purposes of defence, when he shall put his note in suit." This case
was decided on full consideration, and has ever since been followed
in Massachusetts.
In Ranger v. Cary, 1 Mete. 875, in Baxter v. Little, 6 Mete.
7, and in Bond v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Gray 89, the court recognised
the correctness of this decision, notwithstanding the different
decisions in England under a similar statute. In Vinton v. King,
-4 Allen 565, METCALF, J., in summing up the defences available
against the endorsee of a promissory note, among others enumerates "a legal set-off against him [the payee] to the amount
thereof." The statutes of Massachusetts, as revised after the
decision of Sargent v. Southgate,.were changed in their phraseology
apparently rather to make their provisions clear and specific, and
"in conformity with that decision, than to enact a new law.
In New Hampshire, in Woods v. Carlisle, 6 N. Hamp. 27, the
Supreme Court of that state say :-" We are inclined to think
that when a man takes a discredited note, and sues in his own
name, when the defendant has a set-off against the endorser, the
endorser must be considered the plaintiff within the meaning of the
statute. The endorsee stands in the place of the endorser." The
contrary of this doctrine was soon after expressly held by the same
court in the case of Chandler v. Drew, 6 N. Hamp. 469. That
was an action by the endorsee of a discredited promissory note
against the maker, and it was held that a set-off against the endorser could nof be made. The court say :- "The endorsee cannot
be considered as standing in the place of the endorser, unless the
note can be considered as still due to the endorser, or the endorsee,
by taking the discredited note, as having made the set-off his own
VOL. XXIL-3
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debt, either of which is repugnant to common sense." The opinion of the court is very elaborate; the New York and Massachusetts cases, O'Callaghanv. Johnson, Ford v. Stewart, and Sargent

v. Southgate, are examined, and the grounds on which they rest
pronounced unsound and unsatisfactory. This case of Chandler
v. Drew has been sustained in New Hampshire by more recent
cases. See Jenness v. Bean, 10 N. Hamp. 267, and Williams v.
Little, 11 N. Hamp. 72.

In .eDuffie

v. Dame, 11 N. Hamp.

244, the court say that the case of Chandler v. Drew is opposed
to the prevailing doctrine in other states, and that it should not
be extended beyond its precise limits. In Odiorne v. Woodman,
39 N. Hamp. 545, the court recognise the right of set-off, under
certain circumstances, of a claim against the endorser, though the
action be by the endorsee.
The Supreme Court of Maine, in the case of Shirley v. Ford,
9 Greenlf. 83, recognised the right of set-off by defendant against
the endorsee of a dishonored bill, of a claim against the payee.
In Ward v. Warren, 19 Maine 23, the case of Sargent v. South-

gate is referred to as sound law.
A general examination of the decisions of our sister states, and.
the courts of the United States, would be entering upon wilds immeasurably spread, already quite too lengthened. To reduce them
to order, and extract from them any uniform principle, would be
quite impossible. We forbear; we should but lose ourselves in.
the mazes of legal uncertainty. "Whether under our statute a
set-off can be made," said WILLIAMS, J., in giving the opinion of
the court in Stedman v. Jill8on, 10 Conn. 50, "in a case where
the plaintiff sues in his own right, and the debt is against another
person, not a party to the record * * * *

no opinion is ex-

pressed; on that question learned judges have widely differed."
These differences have been vastly multiplied in the forty years
nearly since this opinion was pronounced.
Perceiving, as we do, other grounds, to us abundantly satisfactory, on which to rest our judgment, we shall pass over without
deciding, this vexed question of set-off, and thus avoid adding another to the too long list of conflicting decisions.
The arrangement for a settlement and set-off had been so far
completed in this case, between John Fitch and the defendant,
that a court of equity would readily have enforced it. The parties
had, in effect, agreed as to the mode of paying this note; the
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plaintiff had actual knowledge of each and every fact connectedi
with that agreement, and which, in a manner, attached to the note
itself before he took it. It would be unjust and inequitable that
the defendant should now be compelled to pay this plaintiff, when
it seems more than probable that he will lose his claim against
John Fitch, which is' the larger in amount. True, there is no
finding that he is insolvent, but the fact that this debt has been
in execution for more than a year, and has not been paid, shows
clearly either an .inability, or an indisposition, on his part, to make
payment. That the execution has not been levied and collected,
raises a violent presumption, that if the debtor have means of payment, those means are quite beyond the reach of legal process.
In view of all the facts, this plaintiff is not the equitable and bond
fide owner of this note, and therefore cannot recover. The instrument on which the action is brought was not made negotiable by
the parties, and though the statute authorizes another than the
original party now to sue, we cannot presume that there was any
intention by that change of the law, to affect or impair an equitable
right.
We advise the Court of Common Pleas to render judgment for
the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The general rule of law, that the enThe foregoing case discusses a question of considerable practical importance, dorsee of an overdue note or bill, takes
and which has not always received the it subject to all existing equities, is, so
attention from law writers, which it far as we know, universally recognised
would seem to demand. We had occa- in England and America. But a mere
sion to investigate it at an early day, counter claim of the maker, or acceptor,
Britton v. Bishop, 11 Vt. 70, and then against the payee, does not amount to
came to the conclusion, that the doctrine such an equity, unless it grew out of the
of the English law was contained in note transaction, being a portion or all
Burrough v. Moss, 10 B. &C. 558. The of the consideration, or unless there excourt there reached the conclusion, that isted, before the transfer of the note, some
the endorsee of an overdue negotiable understanding between the maker, or acpromissory note, is liable to meet all the ceptor, and the payee, that the counter
equities growing outof the note transaction claim should apply upon the note.
A mere set-off can only be pleaded at
itself, and to apply upon the note. any
counter demands on the part of the law by the defendant, as against the
maker, against the payee of the note, plaintiff on the record. The cases cited
when there was an agreement, either ex- in the principal case abundantly show
press or implied, to that effect. That', this. And there are numerous others
rule will evidently justify the decision in of the same character. And the existence of a purpose on the part of the dethe principal case.
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fendant to rely upon a counter clai n
against the payee, in defence of an overdue note or bill, and even the giving of
notice to the payee of such purpose, on the
part of the maker, will not preclude the
payee from assigning the note or bill, in
order to evade such set-off, unless he has,
either expressly or by legal implication,
assented to such set-off. This was so
held in Oulds v. Harrison,10 Exch. 572.
The Massachusetts cases, under the
equity of their statute, allow counter
claims on the part of the maker in such
cases to be pleaded in set-off against the
endorsee, provided they existed before

the actual transfer of the note or bill :
Baxter -v. Little, 6 Met. 7 ; Sargent v.
Southqate, 5 Pick. 312. And these cases
have been recognised in some of the
other states, as appears in the opinion
in the principal case. But, in the main,
we think the English rule, as before
stated, is adopted in the "Ameri~an states.
Equity might possibly interfere where
the assignee knew of the existence of a
claim in set-off at the time of his purchase and also of the insolvency of the
payee, and that the effect of the transfer
must be to defraud the maker.
I. F. R.

Supreme Judicial Court qf Vermont.
ROONEY, GUARDIAN OF RYAN, v. SOULE.
The orator alleged in his bill that R., his ward, was the owner of a farm in F.,
and had a homestead therein, and that he was adjudged a bankrupt, and the defendant appointed his assignee, and that said homestead was decreed to R. by the
Court of Bankruptcy ; that R. absconded, and the orator was appointed'his guardian ; that the defendant thereafterwards obtained judgment by default against R.,
before a justice of the peace, without the service of process, notice, or recognisance
for review, and levied his'execution upon, and set off, said homestead ; that it was
the duty of the orator, as such guardian, to sell said homestead for the support of
R.'s family, but that said levy and set-off hindered and impeded his selling the
same, and constituted a cloud upon the title thereof; and prayed that said cloud
be removed. The answer averred that the Court of Bankruptcy adjudged that R.
had a homestead interest in said farm; that the defendant's claim upon which said
judgment was founded, was anterior to the acquisition of said homestead, and
that said homestead was not exempt from said levy and set-off. The case was
heard on bill and answer. Held, that the case was not one for the interposition
of a court of equity.

APPEAL from the Court of Chancery. The case sufficiently appears from the opinion, except that the bill alleged that it was
necessary for the orator, in the due performance of his duty as
guardian, to sell his ward's said homestead interest for the -support
of the family of his said wara, and that the levy and set-off on
the d*efendant's execution, and the record thereof in the townclerk's office, constituted a cloud upon the title of said homestead,
and greatly hindered and impeded the orator in selling the same.
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The court, RoYce, Chancellor, dismissed the bill.
orator.

Appeal by the

JBenton &.irish, for the oratpr.-The bill presents several
grdunds of equity jurisdiction. It claims that the judgment was
irregularly obtained. It is true this would have been grourid for
audita querela, which is a statutory remedy, like the special petition for a new trial on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake.
But it has been held that such remedies are cumulative, and do not
extinguish the remedies previously existing: Alexander v. Abbott,
21 Vt. 476. In the early history of equity jurisprudence, and
before the day of the writ of audita querela, such irregularities
were a well recognised and very common ground of equity jurisdiction. But, be this as it may, the case shows other and very
clear grounds of equity jurisdiction. The bill shows that the
orator, as guardian, is obliged to sell this property for the support
of the children of his ward, and that he cannot make the sale with
this levy outstanding. This levy, then, constitutes a cloud upon
the orator's title, which works him an injury. On this ground,
he has a well recognised ground of relief in chancery to remove
that cloud: .Hodges v. Griggs et al., 21 Vt. 280, 282; Eldridge
T. Smith et aL, 24 Vt. 484; Hilliard Injunct. 304, 550; Eingland
Another ground might be, to prevent
Y. Lewis, 26 Cal. 357.
of
suits.
multiplicity
-. H. Mcntyre, for the defenaant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD, J.-The orator alleges in his bill that his ward, William I. Ryan, was the owner of a farm in Fairfield, and had a
homestead interest therein; that he was adjudged a bankrupt by the
District Court of the United States for Vermont; that the defendant was duly appointed assignee of his assets, and that a homestead was decreed to said Ryan by said court; that Ryan absconded,
and that the orator was appointed his guardian ; after which the
defendant obtained judgment without service of process, or notice
or recognisance for review, before a justice of the peace, against
said Ryan, and levied his execution and set off said homestead.
The answer avers that the District Court adjudged that Ryan had
a homestead interest in said premises; that the defendant's claim.
upon which he obtained said judgment, was anterior to the acquisition of said homestead; that said homestead was not exempt
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from his execution and levy, and that his judgment was regular
and valid. The case was submitted on bill and answer.
I. This is a bill quia timet, to remove a cloud from the plaintiff's
title to a parcel of land. Another cloud, somewhat dense, seems
now to have enveloped the title, by a decree of foreclosure which
.has become absolute against both parties. And as this is averred
and relied upon in the answer, it shquld operate, at least, as a
disclaimer of title on the part of the defendant. It is doubtful,
upon the averments in the bill and answer, whether Ryan had an
absolute and entire homestead. Homesteads, under our statute,
may exist sub modo, subject to certain debts, or mortgage-liens.
Whether it is not the province and duty of the bankrupt court to
marshal the assets of the bankrupt, and determiie priorities of
right and lien, or what has been done as to this property by that
court, is not made very clear in proof or argument. But we think
this not a case for the interposition of a court of equity.
There is no fund locked up awaiting the determination of title,
as in Hodges v. Griggs, 21 Vt. 280, and the court, in that case,
directed the parties to implead at law. There is no averment that
makes this an exception to the common case where one party
claims to be the true owner of land, and alleges that another
claims it without valid title. The jurisdiction of courts of law
and of equity is not concurrent in this class of cases, leaving a
party his election in which forum he will have his rights determined.
But courts of equity will, in their discretion,in exceptional cases,
interpose to prevent fraud and wrong. Where one holds the apparent title, but it is invalid in the hands of those who have notice
of the equities of another, and there is reason to apprehend he
will convey it to an innocent purchaser, a court of equity will interfere to restrain a party from such threatened act; for otherwise
it would work a fraud to an innocent party. But when the title
asserted is all of record, and its infirmities can be exposed at all
times, and against all persons, a court of equity will not interfere,
but leave the party to his remedy at law-the forum provided for
settling such issues of fact. Such is the general current of the
authorities: Van Doren v. Mfayor of New York, 9 Paige 388;
Mallory v. Dougherty, 16 Wis. 267 ; Munson v. Munson, 28 Conn.
582; 1 Story's Eq. Juris. § 700 a, and note; Woodman v. Salstonstall, 7 Cush. 181; Blaekcmore v. Von Vleet, 11 Mich. 252.
In Wing, Adm'r v. Hall J Darling, 44 Vt. 118, WHEEL-ERB
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J., says: "The relief in such cases is granted, not as a matter of
right that the party seeking it has, but as a matter of discretion
that the court may or may not exercise, as appears fit." That
discretion is not arbitrary, but judicial, and is to be exercised in
exceptional cases where the remedy at law is inadequate, and delay
dangerous; or some other ingredient is shown requiring the effectual
powers of equity jurisdiction to prevent fraud and injustice. If
the defendant's judgmient, execution and levy are void, their infirmity is apparent upon the records, which are fixed, and will
remain; and when the defendant attempts to oust the orator by
asserting the validity of his judgment and set-off, there would seem
little danger, and the orator could readily show their invalidity.
But if a party who distrusts his own title and fears that of another, may, at his election, and as an experiment, drag into a court
of equity all persons who may have some claim or title to the
premises, and thus occupy the court in canvassing titles and determining rights that were never asserted, it would be perverting
a rery salutary rule of equity law to needless and mischievous
ends. The inquiry into title to lands, has a special fitness to trial
by jury; and we think that litigation would be abridged, and public justice subserved, by adhering to a just and salutary rule of
law, rather than perverting it to new experiments.
The decree of the Court of Chancery dismissing the orator's bill,
-is affirmed, and the cause is remanded.
The foregoing opinion is upon an important practical question in equity law,
and the opinion of the court seem4 to
be strictly in accordance with established
principles.
The limits of the jurisdiction of courts
of equity upon the subject of the cancellation of outstanding contracts, and
the particular instances in which the
jurisdiction might be invoked, seems to
have been, at an early day, for a long
time, in more or less doubt. But the
jurisdiction is now fully established.
The case of Hamilton v. Cummings, 1
Johns. Ch. 517, reviews all the cases, to
the date of the decision, as was the practice of Chancellor KENT, with the view
of defining the exact boundaries of the
jurisdiction, which the learned Chan-

cellor declared to be most unquestionable, in all cases of outstanding contracts, which might, in any way, operate
as a cloud upon the title of other property owners, whether such contracts
were void at law or not, and whether
the defect in the contract appeared upon
the face of it, or not. The words of
that eminent judge will afford the best
commentary upon the law we could
present. He said:
U While I assert the authority of the
court to sustain such bills, I am not to
be understood as encouraging applications, when the fitness of the exercise
of the power of the court is not pretty
strongly displayed. Perhaps the eases
may all be reconciled on the general
principle, that the exercise of this power
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is to be regulated by sound discretion,
as the circumstances of the individual
case may dictate ; and that the resort to
equity, to be sustained, must be expedient, either because the instrument is
liable to abuse from its negotiable nature, or because the defence not arising
on its face, may be difficult or uncertain
at law, or from some other special circumstances peculiar to the case, and rendering a resort here highly proper, and
clear of all suspicion of any design to
promote expense and litigation. If,
however, the defect appears on the bond
itself, the interference of this court will
still depend on a question of expediency,
and not on a question of jurisdiction.
It may, sometimes, become essential tb
the perfect and tranquil enjoyment of
private right, that this most important
branch of equity power should be exercised in the one case as well as in the
other, and it 'may bh here observed,
that in the case of Law v. Law, Cases
t. Talbot 140, the whole consideration
was spread out upon the bonds, and yet
he [the Chancellor' cancelled the bond
without sending the parties to law."
The doctrine has been maintained in
mast of the American states, and is
thoroughly well established upon the
basis of. Hamilton v. Cummings, supra.
Thus in Massachusetts it is recognised
in Piercev. Lamson, 8 Allen 60 ; Alfartin v. Graves, Id. 601 ; in both of which
cases the instruments set aside, had .been
fraudulently obtained, and might therefore have been defended at law. Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209, was the
case of an outstanding mortgage, and
Sullivan v. Finnigan, 101 Mass. 447,
was the case of a forged deed, in both
of which the defence was equally available at law. The question is somewhat
discussed by WooDnuFF, J., in Williams v. Ktzhugh, 37 N. Y. 444, in regard'to contracts void for usury : Woe
The question
T. Savage, 10 Paige 583.
is very fully presented in Tucker v.

Eenniston, 47 N. I. 267, and the cases
extensively reviewed by the late Chief
Justice BELLOWS.

Mr. Justice STonR, in his Equity
Jurisprudence, defines the jurisdiction
much in the same terms as before stated
by Chancellor KENT, Vol. 1. p. 700,
439, 694, 700, 705. In some of the
cases the c6urts of equity have interfered in, advance to prevent the defendant from creating a cloud upon title:
Tucker v. Keniston, supra; Pellett v.
Shepherd, 5 Paige 493. The jurisdiction is also recognised in Lounsbury v.
Purdy, 18 N. Y. 515; Dean v. Madison,
9 Wis.1 482; Kimberlyq v. Fox, 27
Conn. 807. So that there can remain
no question of its being well established
in all the equity courts of this country
and in England.
The only question which can ever
exist in any such case, after the leading
facts are established, of the existence
of a colorable cloud upon the plaintifPs
title, Will be, whether the particular
circumstances demand the interference
of a court of equity. It must be obvious to ail, that the question, as suggested
in the opinion, will have to be carefully.
weighed, in every such case-whether
the case is an exceptional oie, calling
for the exercise of the power of a court
of equity to prevent fraud and injustice,
and whre the remedy at law is likely
to be delayed so long that there might
be danger of the evidence being lost, or
in some way irremediable wrong intervene. 'nless there appears some very
special and exceptional demand for the
interference of a court of equity, it
should be denied in all such cases.
Any other rule would but invite the
transfer of the trial of all cases affecting the title of land, from the courts of
commons law to those of equity; thus
rendering the two jurisdictions concurrent in all such cases, which no court
I. F. R.
has ever maintained.
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supreme Court of California.
BAXTER v. ROBERTS.
B., who was a carpenter, was employed by R. to go in a boat, upon a submerged
lot owned by him; and ao certain work of his trade. While there at work, a shot
was fired from a house on an adjacent lot, which wounded B., hence his action for
damages. It appeared that R. knew his possession of the lot was resisted and a
resort to arms was immine'nt at any moment. He did not inform B. of this fact,
and the latter had no reason to believe lie was going into danger when employed
to do the work.
Held: R. was liable. The risk B. legally agreed to take was such as was
necessarily incident to his employment.
It. could have relieved himself of responsibility by informing B. of the facts
of the danger.
The concealment of facts, or the failure to state them by employer to employee,
which would tend to expose any hidden and unusual danger to be encountered in
the course of the employment, to a degree beyond that which the employment fairly
imports, renders the employer liable for injuries rejulting therefrom to the employee.

Tais was an action brought by Baxter, a carpenter by occupation, to recover damages for certain injuries sustained by reason
of a gunshot wound received by him at the hands of some unknown
party. Roberts was the owner of. a certain lot in San Francisco,
covered by water, and lying upon the southerly side of Seventh
street, and which had been enclosed by him with a fence, and he
employed the plaintiff to go with him upon these premises and
perform labor there as a carpenter. Upon reaching the lot in a
boat, the plaintiff and another employee in company with the defendant commenced to tear away some boards from a fence newly
erected thereon, and which ran across -the northerly corner of the
lot to Seventh street, when the party were fired upon from a house
or shanty situate upon a neighboring lot to the west of Roberts's
lot, and the plaintiff was shot through the joint of the left shoulder
with a rifle-ball, which carried away portions of the bone, causing
him great physical suffering, and, in the opinion of his medical
attendant, maiming him for life.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The evidence upon the part of the plaintiff
tended to show, and the verdict of the jury upon the issues joined,
must be considered to have found the fact to be, that when the
defendant engaged the services of the plaintiff to work upon these
premises and took him there in the boat for the purpose of perWALLACE,
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forming the labor, the defendant knew or had information such as
would reasonably lead him to believe that his interference with the
newly erected fence would be forcibly resisted by certain other
parties who had erected it and claimed to be in its possession, and
who actually occupied the shanty already referred to with loaded
firearms, within shooting range of this fence, and who had announced to the defendant their purpose to resist by force any
interference therewith. The verdict must be considered, too, to
have found that such knowledge, belief or information as the defendant possessed upon these matters was not communicated to,
but was withheld by him from the plaintiff, who went to the performance of the work in ignorance and without the apprehension
or suspicion that in going, he was incurring any personal danger
or hazard.
The learned judge of the court below stated to the jury that
"the turning-point in this case is the charge that the defendant,
Roberts, employed the plaintiff, Baxter, to perform a service which
he, Roberts, knew to be perilous, without giving Baxter any notice
of its perilous character ;" and instructed them as follows:"If Roberts knew or if he had good reason to believe that rigid
or forcible resistance would be offered to him and his party by parties
whom he knew or believed to be there, on the ground or in the
vicinity near by, it was his duty to inform Baxter of the nature
of the employment, to disclose that knowledge so that Baxter
might act understandingly and take the chances if he chose to do
so. If Roberts had such knowledge and concealed it from the
plaintiff, then he is liable.
"If you find the persons shooting had any adverse possession
or occupation, whether complete or otherwise, at the time of the
shooting, and the defendant knew the fact, and if you further find
that the defendant had knowledge that such possession would be
maintained by force if interfered with by him by the taking of the
' new fence' so called, and concealed such knowledge from the plaintiff, and failed to inform him of the danger of the employment, he
must be held liable in damages, and you should find a verdict for
the plaintiff."
That one contracting to perform labor or render service thereby
takes upon himself such risks and only such as are necessarily and
usually incident to the employment, is well settled. Nor is there
any doubt that if the employer have knowledge or information
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showing that the particular employment is from extraneous causes
known to him to be hazardous or dangerous to a degree beyond
that which it fairly imports, or is understood by the employee to
be, he is bound to inform the latter of the fact or put him in possession of such information; these general principles of law are
elementary and firmly established. They are usually applied to
cases in which the employee has sustained injury by reason of some
defect or unsoundness in the machinery or materials unknown to
him, about which he is employed to perform labor, and of which
the employer knew, or might have known, in the exercise of ordinary care and vigilance on his part. "The general principle which
forbids the employer to expose the employee to unusual risks in
the course of his employment, and to conceal from him the fact of
such danger, is not affected by the fact that the danger known to
the employer arose from the tortious or felonious purposes or designs of third persons acting in hostility to the interests of the
employer and through agencies beyond his control. The employee
is as clearly entitled to information of such known danger of that
character as of any other the'existence of which is known to the
employer. The employer, if he knew or was informed of a threatened danger of that character, was bound to communicate the information to his employee about to be exposed to it in the course
of his employment and in ignorance of its existence. The nature
or character of theagency or means through which the aanger of
injury to the employee is to be apprehended can make no difference
in the rule, for the employee is entitled in all cases to such information upon the subject as the employer may possess, and this
with a view to enable him to determine for himself if, at the
proffered compensation, he be willing to assume the risk and incur
the hazard of the business; and if the employer has such information or knowledge and withholds it from the employee, and the
latter afterwards be injured in consequence thereof, the employer
is liable to him in damages therefor.
Judgment affirmed.
I. For one to lead anotherto expose himself to a dangeror loss known to theformer
and unknown to the latter, whereby the
latter is injured, is a tortfor which action
will lie.
Dig. p. 43, J 2 (De Dole 1alo).Dolus malus non tantum in ea est qul

fallendi causb. obscure loquitur sed etiam
qui insidiose vel obscure dissimalat.
Cicero De Officiis, B. 3, ch. 12 &13."To be silent is one thing, concealment
is another. You may be silent respecting facts within your knowledge, without being guilty of concealment. You
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are guilty of it when the motive of your
silence i; a wish that others for your advantage should be ignorant of facts
which you know, and which it is for
their interest that they should know."
Ohviously too broad a statement and
one to which the author is by no means
fitithful.
Com. Dig. "1Action on the case for
dcceipt," A. 1. "An action upon the
case for a deccipt lies when a man does
any dcceipt to the damage of another."
In C'hapman v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils.
145, where case was held to lie for
maliciously suing out a writ of bankruptcy, WILMOT, C. J., said: " It is
said this action was never brought, and
so it was said in Ashby v. Mhite. I wish
never to hear this objection again. This
action is for a tort ; torts are infinitely
various, not limited or confined, for
there is nothing in nature but may be an
instrument of mischief."
As to cases where recovery is rested
on defendant's duty apart from contract,
vide Marshall v. R. IV., 11 C. B. 655,
opinions of Jznvis, C. J., and WiLLIArS, J. ; Burrows v. Gas Co., infra
p. 48; vide also 7 Am. L. R. 660-1.
In Baiy v. .Merrell, 3 Bulstrode
95, it is said : "Fraud without damage
and damage without fraud gives no cause
of action, bat where these two do both
concur and meet together there an action
lieth,'' &e.
Cushing's Strahan's Domat, Part I.
Book I. Tit. VIII., See. IV. Art. IX.,
p. 620. "When any loss or damage
happens from an accident, and when the
act of some person which is mixed with
the accident has been either the cause or
occasion of the said event, it is by the
nature of the act and by the connection
which it may have with what has happened that we ought to judge whether
the said person should be made to answer for the damage, or should be acquitted of it."
T'ide Keegan v. R. R., 4 Seldun 178-9,
for cases under the general point I.

See Barry v. Croskey, 2 Johns. &
Henning 1, for a statement by V. C.
(since Lord HATIJERLEY) of general
principles as to what constitutes misrepresentation and the liability for it. For
authorities on general point above see
Smith v. Dobson, 3 M. & G. 82.
Contributory negligence is an obvious
exception to above principle, and in our
jurisprudence bars all recovery on plaintiff's part : vide for some qualifications to
this last, Bridge v. Grand Junction R.
R. Co., 3 i. & W. 248: and Lynch v.
Nurdin, I Ad. & El. N. S. 29, per DENMAN, C. J., for cases where trespasser
recovered for injury done him by defendant (the ground seems to be that
the plaintiff's wrong as compared with
defendant's was relatively naught, and
that to it the term "contributory" could
not rightly be applied): and where
plaintiff ignorantly contributing to his
own injury was also allowed to recover.
See Taff v., ll~arman, 2 C. B. N. S.
(89 E. C. L.) p. 739, for dictum as to
cases where a wrong-doer may recover.
Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247.
Plaintiff came as a mere visitor to
defendant's hotel, and on leaving opened
a door to go out from which a piece
of glass fell and hurt him. ])eclaration
alleged carelessness, negligence and default, &c,, on defendant's part. BRAxWELL, B., rested his opinion on the
ground of there being no commission, but merely omission alleged on
defendant's part; that declaration did
not show want of reasonable care,
and that therefore plaintiff could not
recover. A distinction was taken between a visitor invited to a bou-e and
one coming into a shop on business as
against the former. John V. Bacon, L.
R. 5 C. P. 437: Defendant was a carrier of passengers. Plaintiff, such passenger, fell down a hatchway in hulk
which was carrying him to steamer; allowed to recover. BRETT, J., remarked:
"I doubt whether any invitation which
does not amount to a contract or to a
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false and fraudulent misrepresentation
can be the foundation of legal liability.
If the contract of carriage in this case
did not cover the hulk, I should doubt
very much whether the defendant was
Vida Indermaur v. Dames,
liable."
infra.
11. A condition implied in every contract
of employment is that employee shall not be
exposed to any risk which he cannot generally foresee, as for example, such as are
not ordinarilyincident to the employment.
if the employer knows or has it in his power to know of such risk, a concealment of
it is a breach of contract, and if the injury ensue, actions both in tort and contract will lie.
Kee.qan v. Railroad, 4 Selden 178-9;
lirydon v. Stewart, 2 MacQueen 30.
Negligence of fellow-servant is regarded
as an ordinary risk, incident to the employment.
Daties v. England, 33 Law J. Q. B.
321. Eroployer gave employee diseased
beef to cut up, whereby latter was injured.
Action held to lie.
Patersonv. Wallace, 1 MacQueen 751.
" When a master employs a servant in
a work of a dangerous character he is
bound to all reasonable precaution for
the safety of that workman."
Noges v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59. The
master is bound to exercise care and
prudence that those in his employment
be not exposed to unreasonable risks and
dangers.
O'Byrne v. Burn, 16 See. Ser. 1025
(Scotch Case). Plaintiff, who was an
inexperienced employee, was injured in
attending defendant's machinery. Held
to recover. Everything was in proper
order, and the danger was to a degree
obvious ; but plaintiff should never have
been put at such work.
Fraser on Law of Scotland relative to
Master and Servant, p. 93: "The master is bound to take all reasonable precautions which ordinary prudence would
suggest, &e. The general rule appears
to be that on the one hand the master is
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responsible in damages for all injuries
arising from causes which he might have
foreseen and obviated * * * * all risks
which can be said to arise from his rashness, carelessness or neglect, and not
properly to be incident to the contract.
On the other hand, if the servant hl'i
just as good opportunity of making himself aware of the danger as the master,"
&a.
Cushing's Strahan's Domat, l'art I.
Book I. Tit. XV. Sec. IL Art. VI.
(p. 471). "If a proxy or agent suffers
any loss or damage on account of the
affair which he has taken in hand, we
must judge by the circumstances whether
the loss ought to fall on the proxy or
on the person whose affair he manages;
which will depend on the quality of the
order which was to be executed, the
danger if any-the nature of the event
which has occasioned the loss-the connection between the event and the order
that was executed-the relation which
the thing lost or the damage sustained had
to the affair which was the occasion of
it, &c., and on the circumstances which
may charge the one or the other with
the loss or discharge them of it. As to
which we must cast into the balance the
consideration of equity and the sentiments of humanity which one ought
to have whose interest has been the cause
or occasion of loss to another."
Indermaurv. Dames, 2 Law Rep. C.
P. 313, KELLY, (C.B). "If a person
occupying such premises (i. e. with shaftholes in the different stories), enters into
a contract in the fulfilment of which
workmen must come on the premises
who probably do not know what is usual
in such places, and are unacquainted
with the danger they are likely to incur,
is he not bound either to put up some
fence or safe-guard about the hole, or if
he does not, to give such workmen a
reasonable notice that they must take
care and avoid the danger ? I think the
law does impose such an obligation on
him. That view was taken in the judg-
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ment in the court below, where it is said
(by WILLES, J.), 'With respect to
such a visitor at least we consider it
settled law that he, using reasonable care
on his part for his own safety, is entitled
to expect that the occupier shall on his
part use reasonable care to prevent
damage from unusual danger which he
knows or ought to know; and that when
there is evidence of neglect the question
whether such reasonable care has been
taken by notice, lighting, guarding or
otherwise, &c., is matter of fact for the
jury.' is

Britton v. Great We stern Cotton Company, 41 L. J. Exch. 99. Defendants by
statute were required to fence a certain
wheel, which they failed to do. Plaintiff's
intestate was killed by the wheel. Jury
found that there was no contributory negligence on decedent's part. Court held
that decedent by merely engaging upon
the work, the danger of it not being
"
obvious, was not "volens, and the plaintiff on the verdict could recover.
Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1.
Master does not guarantee servant's
safety i. e. is not responsible for unknown
danger: is not bound to take more care
of the servant than he may be expected
to take of himself. See Lord ABINGER'S
opinion. In this case plaintiff must
have known danger as well as master.
Cooms v. New Bedford Co., 102 Mass.
572. The extract from head-note given
below contains all the law and facts of
this case relevant to our purpose. For
a full repertory'of cases bearing on the
point now under consideration, see argument for plaintiff's counsel, pages
577-80, and p. 595 ; see also opinion of
IIOAit and GRAT, JJ.
Extract from head-note: "The fact
that very near where a workman is
voluntarily employed in a manufactory,
machinery not connected with his work
is in motion the dangerous nature of
which is visible and constant, is not conclusive that he has taken on himself the
risk of being injured by it in modifica-

tion of the implied contract of his employer to provide for him a reasonably
safe place in which to do his work, and
if through inattention to the danger he
meets with such an injury while doing
his work, and sues his employer therefor, the question whether he met with it
with due care on his own part and by
reason of the neglect of his employer
to give him suitable notice of the danger,
is for the jury."
Riley v. Baxendale, 6 H. & N. 443.
Held that from ordinary contract of service, a stipulation that employer should
not expose employee to extraordinary
risk could not be inferred. There might
be a duty, but duty did not raise a contract. Plaintiff had no business, if employment was dangerous, to undertake it ;
and in this case he must have known
the danger quite as well as the master.
Williams v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258:
Unsafe iladder of employer, defendant ;
recovery because danger unknown to
plaintiff. Wonder v. Baltimore, R. R.
Co., 32 Md. 411: Dictum: Master must
not expose servant to extraordinary
risks. Mellors v. Shaw, 101 E. C. L.
(1 B. & S.), p. 437, for authorities on
master's liability towards servant for
negligence. Peck v.. Neil, 3 McL. 22:
Action by stage passenger against negligent carrier; another stage not'belonging to defendant contributed to the
injury, 'recovery allowed; said the court,
"Every omission of duty by the driver
which in any degree increased the risk
of the passengers, subjected the defendant to damages for an injury done them.
That although the upsetting of the stage
may have been caused immediately by
the driver of the mail-stage" (the third
party), "for which he and his employers
were liable to damages, still, if Neil's
(defendant's) driver under the circumstances did not use all the means which
a skilful and prudent driver could and
mould have used to prevent the injury
done, the defendant is liable."
III. The contributory n'gligenre of a
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third person without which the defendant's
negligencewould not have harmedtheplaintiff, is no defence. There is no distinction
between the wilful and negligentfault of
such thirdperson. It is immaterialwhether
the risk comesfrom the dangerous condition
of a material object into connection with
which the employee is brought orfrom the
dangerous acts of a third person.
In Lockhart v. Lictenthaler, 4 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 15 (46 Penn. 158),
will be found a very full discussion
of the point whether plaintiff, a passenger, injured by the concurring negligence
of his carrier and a third person, has any
action against third person. It will be
seen that his action against carrier is
never questioned, nor is it suggested that
the fault of third person would avail
carrier as a defence. The court held
only that no action lay against third
party; ind while some of the authorities
cited rested the ruling on identity of
passenger with carrier, thought it a
principle of public policy to incite carriers to diligence and prudence; it will
he seen that the cases on this question
are quite at war. Besides cases cited
in opinion see.Peck v. Neil, 3 McLean
23, and Brown v. R. R., 32 N. Y. 602,
and Mooney v. R. R.; 5 Robertson (N.
Y.) 548.
Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Ad. & E. (N. S)
29, 41 E. C. L. 426. Defendant left
cart standing, a child led horse over
plaintiff, another child.-Action lay.
DENMAN, C. J., says : "Between wilful mischief and gross negligence, the
boundary line is hard to trace, I should
rather say impossible. The law runs
them into each other, considering such
a degree of negligence as some proof
of malice." This is applied to defendant, and certainly to a still less degree
could the distinction be taken in regard
to wrong of the contributing third
person.
Smith v. Dobson, I M. & G. 60.
Plaintiff's barge was sunk by a swell
caused by the defendant's steamer, which

plaintiff alleged was run too near barge
and too rapidly. Defence that a larger
steamer first caused the swell and defendant only increased it ; with a further plea
of mismanagement on part of plaintiff's
servant. The Lord Chief Justice told
the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover if, in their judgment, the
misconduct of the plaintiff's servants or
the insufficient manning of the barge
contributed to the loss, or if the injury
was occasioned wholly by the Ramona
(the larger steamer). Verdict for
plaintiff, not disturbed on rule. ERSKINE, J., said: "I also am of opinion
that there is no ground for entering a
verdict for defendant, and that verdict
found for plaintiff was right ; the jury
might well conclude from the evidence
that the defendant had either caused or
contributed to the accident. Though the
swell occasioned by the Water-Lily "
(defendant's steamer), "might not
have sunk the barge if the water had
not been previously agitated by the Ramona, still if the jury thought that the
accident would not have occurred but for
the improper conduct of the defendant's
servants, the defendant was in strictness
liable for the whole damage. Mott v.
Hudson R. R., 8 Bosw. 345, concurrent
wrong of third person no defence to
defendants : Colegrove v. Harlem R. R.,
6 Duer 382, and N. Y. 6- N. H. R. R.,
20 N. Y. 492, relied on. Defendant's
train cut hose of firemen trying to put
out fire, which injured plaintiff's property, held to be error to direct the
jury that if firemen were negligent in
not warning train, plaintiff could not
recover.
Eaton v. Boston J- Lowell R. R., 11
Allen 505. Action of tort by passenger
against carrier for injury to person.
COLT, J.-" It is no answer to an action
by a passenger against a carrier that the
negligence or trespass of a third person
contributed to the injury. These propositions would be more manifest if this
action had been brought in form upon

.BAXTER v. ROBERTS.
the implied undertaking of the defendants, but the plaintiff may elect to sue
in tort or contract, and the rule of duty
is the same in either form of action:
Warren v. Thtchburq R. R, 8 Allen
227 ; Iagall v. Bills, 9 Met. I ; MrElroy v. Nashua 6- Lowell R. .R., 4 Cush.
400; Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 6-c., R.
R., 30 Penn. State R. 234. Even if no
privity of contract existed and the injury was the result of the joint acts of
defendants and the owner of the load
of hay and the Eastern R. R. Co., it
would furnish no defence to this action:
for in actions of this description nonjoinder of the defendants cannot be
availed of in bar. And this is true although the party contributing by his
negligence was acting without concert
with and entirely independent of the
defendants : Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. &
P. 190.
Burrows v. The AFarch Gas 4- Coke Co.,
L. R. 5 Excb. 67, (affirmed L. R. 7
The defendants, a gas
Exch. 96).
company, having contracted to supply
the plaintiff with a service-pipe from
their main to the meter on his premises, laid down a defective pipe from
which the gas escaped. A workman
in the employ of a gas-fitter engaged
by the plaintiff to lay down the pipes
leading from the meter over the premises, negligently took a lighted candle for the purpose of finding out
whence the escape proceeded. An explosion then took place whereby damage
was occasioned to the plaintiff's premises,
to recover compensation for which the
plaintiff brought his action against the
defendants.
Held, 1. That the damage was not too
remote :
2. That the plaintiff not being master of the workman could not be considered as contributing to the damage by
reason of his act : and
3. Was therefore entitled to recover.
Says KELLY. C. B., after stating the
case and arguing that the plaintiff was

not responsible for the workman's negligence: "The defendants having been
guilty of negligence by which the accident was caused, the plaintiff is entitled
to maintain his action to recover compensation from the defendants for the
damage occasioned to his property."
Says CIHANNELL, B.: "It does not
appear to me in the view I take, very
important whether this action should be
considered as founded in contract or
upon a duty. Whether it was the case
of a contract or of a duty, it seems to
me the defendants have failed in the
performance of it, and the consequence
of such a failure was the damage complained of."
Says PIGOTT, B.: "It was argued
for the defendants that the damage was
too remote. Now the mere fact that
there is another cause brought in without which the damage would not have
occurred, does not in my view make the
first and main cause a remote cause of
the damage; it can only disentitle the
plaintiff to recover in cases where the
ground may be taken that he has contributed that without which the damage
would not have occurred. It seems to
me that the escape of the gas was plainly
the proximate cause of the damage of
which the plaintiff complains. If that
be so, though there is another cause
without which the explosion would not
have happened, yet that does not disentitle the plaintiff from recovery, unless
he can be affected by the negligent conduct of Sharratt" (the workman), " and
so must be taken to have contributed to
the damage. I do not think that the
plaintiff is responsible, &c. As my
Lord has put it, there were two independent contractors employed by the plaintiff to do work upon the premises. Both
are guilty of negligence by which the
plaintiff sustains considerable damage.
Is the plaintiff disentitled to complain
of the negligence of one because the
other contributed to the damage ? It
seems to me he ought to be entitled to
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complain of both and to he able to re - a driver of a third truck tried to pass becover against both. The fact that he it tween the two, and was not negligent in
entitled to recover against one cannoi * so doing; he upset defendant's truck,
deprive him of his right' to recovei whereby plaintiff was hurt. Action susagainst the other."
tained citing Lynch v. Nurdin.
Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio 465: : Danville Turnpike Co. v. Stewart, 2
Defendant having had a quarrel with a Mete. (Ken.) p. 122: Dictum: " Where
boy in the street in a city, took up .a an injury is 'aaie by ntg!iger.ce of two
pick-axe and followed him 'into* tlic persons; -tho falt. 9t:
'one is. no excuse
plaintiff's store whither he fled, and in for that of the other. Both in that case
eudeavoring to keep out of defendaa,'.i are liablet tlv.
party injured."
reach the boy ran against and knocked
MtleCahi. v. Kipr, 2 E. 1). Smith
out the faucet from a cask of wine, by 413. Defendant left his horse standing;
means of which a quantity of wine ran a third person frightened it so that it ran
out and was wasted: held that the de- away and injured plaintiff. Action lay.
fendant was liable to the plaintiff in
Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 Carrington & P.
damages.
190. Defendant left his cart unguarded;
See also Ricker v. Frleeman, II Am. a hird person struck the horse so that
Law Reg. N. S. 692.
it backed into and broke plaintiff's winIn Guille v. Swan, 19 Johnson 381, dow. Action lay.
the immediate actors in the wrong
Mooney v. B. R., 5 Roberts (N. Y.)
which was done to the plaintiff were 553. "Even a party," says ROBERTmoved by their sympathy for the defend- soN, J., "guilty of negligence himself
ant, who had brought himself iuito a peril- is, in reference to the degree of care he
ous condition by ascending in a balloon. is bound to use, entitled to rely on the
The balloon descended into plaintiff's obligation of others to use ordinary
garden, which was near where it had care to avoid the consequences of his
gone up, and a crowd of people seeing negligence when threatened by it with
the defendant hanging out of the car in an injury, and is exempted from liabilgreat peril, rushed into the garden to ity for the effect of a failure by others
relieve him, and in so doing trod down to discharge their duty in that respect."
the learned
the plaintiff's vegetables and flowers. By the word "others"
For the wrong done by the crowd as judge appears to have referred not to
wqll as for the injury done by himself, third persons but to plaintiffs guilty of
the defendant was held answerable as a contributory negligence.
IV. Where the attempt of the emtrespasser. Although the ascent was
not illegal, it was a foolish act, and the ployer to have his work carried out is the
defendant ought to have foreseen that contingency which determines the happening
injurious consequences might follow. of the injury, the employment is causa
The case seems not to have been put causans and not merely caus& sine quupon the ground of a concert of action non of the injury.
between the defendant and the multitude,
Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 247.
but on the ground that the defendant's Says PoLLocK, C. B. : "I am desirous
descent, under such circumstances,would to be understood that I entertain conordinarily and naturally draw a crowd siderable doubt whether a person who is
of people about him either from curios- guilty of negligence is responsible for
all the consequences which may under
ity," &c.
Powell v. Deveny, 3 Cush. 300. De- any circumstances arise, and in respect
fendant negligently left his truck in of mischief which could by no reasonthe street ; another truck stood opposite: able person have been anticipated.
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